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Commentary
Towards a Confucian geopolitics:
A critical remark
Xin Liu
Liverpool John Moores University, UK
Abstract
This commentary reviews An et al.’s (2021) article, ‘Towards Confucian Geopolitics’. It first acknowledges
the article’s achievement in highlighting the importance of reading geopolitics by excavating the Chinese
traditions and cultural perspectives. However, the commentary also points out that An et al.’s article has
failed to understand the complex nature of the Confucian ideology by differentiating between real-world
political struggle and cultural idealism. The lack of an evolving political geography has made their reading of
Confucianism as either an official ideology or spatialisation unable to correspond with concrete historical
realities. Specifically, it has resulted in over-simplification in benchmarking Chinese history and the
dichotomous understanding of Hua-Yi division. The commentary further points out that the above problem
is a general issue with the culturalist approach to world politics.
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China’s rise is posing both empirical as well as the-
oretical challenges to mainstream international rela-
tions (IR) and social sciences. As Kerry Brown has
put it, determining what China is thinking is the
‘philosopher’s gold’ in modern international rela-
tions (2017: 21–22). Lucian Pye’s (1990) important
statement about the nature of the modern Chinese
state, that ‘China is a civilisation pretending to be a
nation-state’, has implied the rich historical legacies
for envisioning and pinpointing China’s contempo-
rary behaviours. Confucianism is certainly a pro-
found tradition from which understanding about
Chinese foreign policies and geo-strategic positions
could be derived, and this is central to An et al.’s
(2021) article.
Like most constructivist or culturalist approaches
aiming at extrapolating from cultural legacies, An
et al. are slightly more ambitious. They argue that
the Confucian tradition is the key not only to under-
standing the origins of China’s geo-strategic think-
ing, but also the way that China’s contemporary
geopolitical practices are expressed and justified.
An et al.’s cultural and historical approach builds
on a critical awareness of the pitfalls of the extant
analysis of Chinese foreign relations, the anachronic
account that views China’s geopolitics either as a
‘communist’ tradition or a result of converging with
global values. They also imply that the popular
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claim that Chinese geopolitics is nationalistic is the-
oretically unfounded as the very form of ‘national-
ism’ is not sufficiently unpacked. Their article
proposes a ‘synthesising’ approach by bridging
China’s historical legacies with contemporary
experiences, and it also promises to address the
discrepancies between rhetoric and reality. If the
concept of Confucianism is sufficiently addressed,
the article is well positioned to provide an angle
of seeing China’s emerging global status from a
Chinese vantage point, which is central to the
ongoing postcolonial project of ‘discovering history
in China’ (Cohen, 2003: 48; 2010).
An et al. pursue the argument in the article in
three parts. First, they extrapolate from the Confu-
cian classics a dimension of spatiality which they
consider bears the potential for a geopolitical imag-
ination. They then analyse narratives in contempo-
rary Chinese geopolitics to highlight how Confucian
elements have been embedded in different levels.
Finally, they propose a ‘hybrid-Confucian geopoli-
tical theory’ as a cultural explanation of China’s
geopolitics and foreign policy orientations. The arti-
cle makes it explicit that Confucianism as a macro-
historical ideology operates on both rhetorical and
pragmatic levels, while it is fundamentally impor-
tant that it features a substantial normative dimen-
sion for understanding Chinese geopolitics.
Interpreting Confucianism is a challenging enter-
prise and the authors are conscious of the historical
variation of the concept itself.
In order to set out the meaning of Confucianism,
An et al. have identified a set of key concepts as the
constitutive elements of Confucianism. Their under-
standing of Confucianism is not different from the
mainstream narratives derived from the Confucian
classics including The Analects and Mencius. Har-
mony, hierarchy, and order have altogether consti-
tuted the ladder through which a Confucian thinker
proceeds from individual morality to world order.
The first analytical section of their article has cor-
rectly highlighted the Han Dynasty as the historical
moment at which Confucianism was centralised as
the official ideology endorsed by the emperors. It
has also suggested that the act of indoctrination of
ideology happened in the meantime as the ‘Confu-
cianism-only’ ideology was adopted by the state,
namely the idea of ‘monarchical authority’. Here
is a questionable omission in translation. The
so-called ‘monarchical authority’ is annotated as
‘junquan shenshou’ in Chinese, which may poten-
tially be a misunderstanding as ‘shen’ (divinity or
god) is a concept largely absent in the Chinese tra-
dition. ‘Junquan shenshou’ (the mandate of god) is
more of a concept for western absolutism (Ander-
son, 1979) while the Chinese-Confucian under-
standing is closer to the concept of ‘tianyi’ (the
mandate of heaven) in which the source of legiti-
macy comes from a harmonious relationship
between human and nature (Zhao, 2006). As ‘tia-
nyi’, the heavenly will is a remarkably abstract field,
and it has allowed not only the justification of the
imperial order, but also the political activism and
even military struggle against it mobilised in the
same name. The omission of the political under the
broad church of ‘tianyi’ is what prevents the authors
from seeing the discontinuities in Chinese imperial
history when they attempt to map out the transfor-
mation across a huge historical timespan. In docu-
menting the ‘transformation’ from Han through
Tang-Song to Ming-Qing, the period of political
fragmentation has been largely ignored. It is note-
worthy that the political history instead of the ideo-
logical history is more pertinent to the evolution of
Confucianism. The Qing Dynasty was a cosmopo-
litan empire founded by bordered tribes, and the
Manchus were essential for understanding Confu-
cianism’s international outlook, given that the Qing
Dynasty itself had integrated a number of peripheral
polities to the realm of Chinese empire, transform-
ing the external to internal relations (Hevia, 1995,
Liu, 2016). The Qing Dynasty was a result of his-
torical accumulation and the process of internalising
the externals through endless political struggle. It
should be perceived as the foundation of the spati-
ality in the Confucian cosmology, especially regard-
ing the ‘Hua-Yi’ (Chinese-Barbaric) separation.
An et al. argue that Confucian geopolitics is built
upon a spatial dichotomy between the Chinese mid-
dle kingdom and the barbaric territories. This spa-
tialisation was largely based upon the notion of
Confucian cultural superiority and other normative
values. This division is fundamentally Sino-centric,
seeing the rest of the world outside of the Han-
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Confucian cultural heartland as the fringe of ‘Yi’
(barbarians). This is certainly a correct observation
for many dynastic generations, but it is not necessa-
rily geopolitical. In fact, we could find ethnocentric
ideologies underlying many foreign relations think-
ing which are ultimately notions of ‘self and other’.
There is hardly any geographical dimension in this
account of ‘Confucian geopolitics’ apart from a con-
ventional perception of insiders and outsiders. The
authors have omitted the fact that the history of
political struggle has actually preceded the history
of ideology. Conquerors, whether they originated in
the northern frontier or were Han agrarian groups,
only resorted to Confucian ideology when they
faced the question of governing a continent and a
vast agrarian population for which they had to rely
on an immense scholar-official class (shidafu)
(Moore, 1967). It was the scholar-officials who
upheld Confucianism as their moral principles with
which they were eager to sell their knowledge and
service to the emperors, and not that emperors fol-
lowed or did not follow the Confucian principles to
visualise geopolitics. Historians have already found
that the Qing rulers, who were originally hunter-
gathering tribes, had long been tossed between
preserving their tribal identity and adapting to the
Confucian scholarship (Elliott, 2001; Rawski,
1998). The Qing Dynasty was a Janus-faced orga-
nisation. They addressed the traditional scholar-
official class using Confucian rhetoric while
addressing bordered ethnic groups, such as the Mon-
gols, the Tibetans, and the Uighur Muslims using
other religions. The Hua-Yi division will certainly
need to be further scrutinised to avoid simplicity.
Over-simplification of the division is not only a chal-
lenge for the authors of the anchor article in this issue,
but also a challenge for most people who want to
decipher China’s geopolitical thinking via cultural
approaches. In the authors’ own words, there are
always differences between ideal-types and realities.
The ethnic and geographical complexities of the
Qing Dynasty could hardly be abstracted as a form
of Confucian geopolitics even if Confucianism had
played its role throughout the state-formation of the
Qing Dynasty. Most importantly, the Qing Empire’s
relationships with all its bordered neighbours were
established through multiple techniques and
diplomatic channels (Hevia, 1995; Perdue, 2005,
2009; Waley-Cohen, 2000). It is important to note
that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has inher-
ited not only the territory and ethnic relationships
but also the basic crisis of the Qing Dynasty, without
which it will be difficult to correspond the CCP’s
practice directly with the Confucian tenets. The
authors have made a rough periodisation of the
CCP’s foreign history by dividing it into the Com-
munist period (1949–1979) and the Socialist period
(1979–present), and they have made an effort to
show how intertwined the Confucian ideology has
been with the communist ideology. It is correct to
argue that communism, as a political teaching as
well as a way of imagining the world order, has
come on and off in the history of the PRC, but it is
hard to tell whether the not-so-communist periods
could be characterised as Confucianism (Chen,
2001). The authors have attempted to show that
Zhou Enlai’s ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-
tence’ and Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s socialist mor-
alities are spiritually in line with Confucianism,
which is an interesting comparison. However, this
could be largely misleading as Zhou Enlai’s
thoughts have particular origins and contexts; he
was establishing the ‘Five Principles’ mainly for the
newly independent and postcolonial nations, and he
did not really see those partners through the lens of
‘cultural hierarchy’ (Chen, 2008). Hu Jintao and Xi
Jinping’s thoughts are mostly for domestic con-
sumption, and they have almost no bearing on for-
eign relations or geopolitics.
Perhaps the most challenging task that An et al.
have taken on is interpreting the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI). The BRI is as confusing to most scho-
lars as it is practically inconsistent and theoretical
ambiguous. I always believe that to conceptualise
the BRI is an overambitious project because the
programme is only an ‘initiative’ on the current
stage and its immediate, practical, and material con-
sideration might have outweighed its strategic and
ideological thinking. There is an important contra-
diction in the authors’ analysis of the BRI. While
they attempt to emphasise its geostrategic aspect by
referring to Mackinder’s heartland theory, they still
believe that there is a Chinese-Confucian idealism
that emphasises the connection of ‘minds’ instead of
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material interests. Isn’t it the case that any material
competition may be dressed under a certain form of
cultural idealism, if we just go back to Edward
Carr’s cynicism a century ago?
Overall, I believe that An et al.’s (2021) article is
a very provocative attempt to approach non-western
strategic thinking from a cultural vantage point, and
they are certainly courageous enough to reach out
for the ‘philosopher’s gold’ in IR – namely, inter-
preting China’s mentality. However, studies along
this line have been attempted many times in the last
decade from the concept of Chinese exceptionalism
(Zhang, 2009, 2011, 2014) and ‘tianxia’ (Zhao,
2006) to the very ambitious ‘Confucian Long Peace’
(Kelly, 2012). The main danger with the concept of
‘culture’ is that it can be so easily regarded as a
‘unmoved mover’ of history, and the politics, trau-
mas, and hypocrisies under its name are likely to be
neglected.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest
with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the
research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
References
An N, Sharp J and Shaw I (2021) Towards a Confucian
geopolitics. Dialogues in Human Geography. DOI: 10.
1177/2043820620951354.
Anderson P (1979) Lineages of the Absolutist State.
Brooklyn, NY: Verso.
Brown K (2017) China’s World: What Does China Want?
London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Chen J (2001) Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Chen J (2008) Bridging revolution and decolonization:
the “Bandung discourse” in China’s early cold war
experience. The Chinese Historical Review 15(2):
207–241.
Cohen PA (2003) China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives
on the Chinese Past. London: Routledge.
Cohen PA (2010) Discovering History in China: Ameri-
can Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past.
New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Elliott MC (2001) The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners
and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China. Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Hevia JL (1995) Cherishing Men From Afar: Qing Guest
Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Kelly RE (2012) A ‘Confucian long peace’ in
pre-Western East Asia? European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 18(3): 407–430.
Liu X (2016) Anarchy in the East: Eurocentrism,
China-centred geopolitics and uneven and combined
development. International Politics 53(5): 574–595.
Moore B (1967) Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Perdue PC (2005) China Marches West. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Perdue PC (2009) Nature and nurture on imperial China’s
frontiers. Modern Asian Studies 43(1): 245–267.
Pye LW (1990) China: erratic state, frustrated society.
Foreign Affairs 69(4): 56–74.
Rawski ES (1998) The Last Emperors: A Social History of
Qing Imperial Institutions. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Waley-Cohen J (2000) The Sextants of Beijing: Global
Currents in Chinese History. New York, NY: WW
Norton & Company.
Zhang F (2009) Rethinking the ‘tribute system’: broad-
ening the conceptual horizon of historical East Asian
politics. The Chinese Journal of International Politics
2(4): 545–574.
Zhang F (2011) The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in
international relations. European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 19: 305–328.
Zhang F (2014) How hierarchic was the historical East
Asian system? International Politics 51(1): 1–22.
Zhao T (2006) Rethinking empire from a Chinese concept
‘all-under-heaven’ (Tian-xia). Social Identities 12(1):
29–41.
264 Dialogues in Human Geography 11(2)
